THE RUNAWAY GENERAL
Stanley McChrystal, Obama’s top commander in Afghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House.
By Michael Hastings; Rolling Stone, July 8-22, 2010
‘How’d I get screwed into going to this dinner?” demands Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It’s a Thursday night in mid-April, and the commander of all U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is sitting in a four-star suite at the Hôtel Westminster in Paris. He’s in France to sell his new war strategy to our NATO allies – to keep up the fiction, in essence, that we actually have allies. Since McChrystal took over a year ago, the Afghan war has become the exclusive property of the United States. Opposition to the war has already toppled the Dutch government, forced the resignation of Germany’s president and sparked both Canada and the Netherlands to announce the withdrawal of their 4,500 troops. McChrystal is in Paris to keep the French, who have lost more than 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, from going all wobbly on him.
“The dinner comes with the position, sir,” says his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn.
McChrystal turns sharply in his chair.
“Hey, Charlie,” he asks, “does this come with the position?”
McChrystal gives him the middle finger.
The general stands and looks around the suite that his traveling staff of 10 has converted into a full-scale operations center. The tables are crowded with silver Panasonic Toughbooks, and blue cables crisscross the hotel’s thick carpet, hooked up to satellite dishes to provide encrypted phone and e-mail communications. Dressed in off-the-rack civilian casual – blue tie, button-down shirt, dress slacks – McChrystal is way out of his comfort zone. Paris, as one of his advisers says, is the “most anti-McChrystal city you can imagine.” The general hates fancy restaurants, rejecting any place with candles on the tables as too “Gucci.” He prefers Bud Light Lime (his favorite beer) to Bordeaux, Talladega Nights (his favorite movie) to Jean-Luc Godard. Besides, the public eye has never been a place where McChrystal felt comfortable: Before President Obama put him in charge of the war in Afghanistan, he spent five years running the Pentagon’s most secretive black ops.
“What’s the update on the Kandahar bombing?” McChrystal asks Flynn. The city has been rocked by two massive car bombs in the past day alone, calling into question the general’s assurances that he can wrest it from the Taliban.
“We have two KIAs, but that hasn’t been confirmed,” Flynn says.
McChrystal takes a final look around the suite. At 55, he is gaunt and lean, not unlike an older version of Christian Bale in Rescue Dawn. His slate-blue eyes have the unsettling ability to drill down when they lock on you. If you’ve fucked up or disappointed him, they can destroy your soul without the need for him to raise his voice.
“I’d rather have my ass kicked by a roomful of people than go out to this dinner,” McChrystal says.
He pauses a beat.
“Unfortunately,” he adds, “no one in this room could do it.”
With that, he’s out the door.
“Who’s he going to dinner with?” I ask one of his aides.
“Some French minister,” the aide tells me. “It’s fucking gay.”
The next morning, McChrystal and his team gather to prepare for a speech he is giving at the École Militaire, a French military academy. The general prides himself on being sharper and ballsier than anyone else, but his brashness comes with a price: Although McChrystal has been in charge of the war for only a year, in that short time he has managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict. Last fall, during the question-and-answer session following a speech he gave in London, McChrystal dismissed the counterterrorism strategy being advocated by Vice President Joe Biden as “shortsighted,” saying it would lead to a state of “Chaos-istan.” The remarks earned him a smackdown from the president himself, who summoned the general to a terse private meeting aboard Air Force One. The message to McChrystal seemed clear: Shut the fuck up, and keep a lower profile.
Now, flipping through printout cards of his speech in Paris, McChrystal wonders aloud what Biden question he might get today, and how he should respond. “I never know what’s going to pop out until I’m up there, that’s the problem,” he says. Then, unable to help themselves, he and his staff imagine the general dismissing the vice president with a good one-liner.
“Are you asking about Vice President Biden?” McChrystal says with a laugh. “Who’s that?”
“Biden?” suggests a top adviser. “Did you say: Bite Me?”
When Barack Obama entered the Oval Office, he immediately set out to deliver on his most important campaign promise on foreign policy: to refocus the war in Afghanistan on what led us to invade in the first place. “I want the American people to understand,” he announced in March 2009. “We have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He ordered another 21,000 troops to Kabul, the largest increase since the war began in 2001. Taking the advice of both the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he also fired Gen. David McKiernan – then the U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan – and replaced him with a man he didn’t know and had met only briefly: Gen. Stanley McChrystal. It was the first time a top general had been relieved from duty during wartime in more than 50 years, since Harry Truman fired Gen. Douglas MacArthur at the height of the Korean War.
Even though he had voted for Obama, McChrystal and his new commander in chief failed from the outset to connect. The general first encountered Obama a week after he took office, when the president met with a dozen senior military officials in a room at the Pentagon known as the Tank. According to sources familiar with the meeting, McChrystal thought Obama looked “uncomfortable and intimidated” by the roomful of military brass. Their first one-on-one meeting took place in the Oval Office four months later, after McChrystal got the Afghanistan job, and it didn’t go much better. “It was a 10-minute photo op,” says an adviser to McChrystal. “Obama clearly didn’t know anything about him, who he was. Here’s the guy who’s going to run his fucking war, but he didn’t seem very engaged. The Boss was pretty disappointed.”
From the start, McChrystal was determined to place his personal stamp on Afghanistan, to use it as a laboratory for a controversial military strategy known as counterinsurgency. COIN, as the theory is known, is the new gospel of the Pentagon brass, a doctrine that attempts to square the military’s preference for high-tech violence with the demands of fighting protracted wars in failed states. COIN calls for sending huge numbers of ground troops to not only destroy the enemy, but to live among the civilian population and slowly rebuild, or build from scratch, another nation’s government – a process that even its staunchest advocates admit requires years, if not decades, to achieve. The theory essentially rebrands the military, expanding its authority (and its funding) to encompass the diplomatic and political sides of warfare: Think the Green Berets as an armed Peace Corps. In 2006, after Gen. David Petraeus beta-tested the theory during his “surge” in Iraq, it quickly gained a hardcore following of think-tankers, journalists, military officers and civilian officials. Nicknamed “COINdinistas” for their cultish zeal, this influential cadre believed the doctrine would be the perfect solution for Afghanistan. All they needed was a general with enough charisma and political savvy to implement it.
As McChrystal leaned on Obama to ramp up the war, he did it with the same fearlessness he used to track down terrorists in Iraq: Figure out how your enemy operates, be faster and more ruthless than everybody else, then take the fuckers out. After arriving in Afghanistan last June, the general conducted his own policy review, ordered up by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The now-infamous report was leaked to the press, and its conclusion was dire: If we didn’t send another 40,000 troops – swelling the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by nearly half – we were in danger of “mission failure.” The White House was furious. McChrystal, they felt, was trying to bully Obama, opening him up to charges of being weak on national security unless he did what the general wanted. It was Obama versus the Pentagon, and the Pentagon was determined to kick the president’s ass.
Last fall, with his top general calling for more troops, Obama launched a three-month review to re-evaluate the strategy in Afghanistan. “I found that time painful,” McChrystal tells me in one of several lengthy interviews. “I was selling an unsellable position.” For the general, it was a crash course in Beltway politics – a battle that pitted him against experienced Washington insiders like Vice President Biden, who argued that a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would plunge America into a military quagmire without weakening international terrorist networks. “The entire COIN strategy is a fraud perpetuated on the American people,” says Douglas Macgregor, a retired colonel and leading critic of counterinsurgency who attended West Point with McChrystal. “The idea that we are going to spend a trillion dollars to reshape the culture of the Islamic world is utter nonsense.”
In the end, however, McChrystal got almost exactly what he wanted. On December 1st, in a speech at West Point, the president laid out all the reasons why fighting the war in Afghanistan is a bad idea: It’s expensive; we’re in an economic crisis; a decade-long commitment would sap American power; Al Qaeda has shifted its base of operations to Pakistan. Then, without ever using the words “victory” or “win,” Obama announced that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, almost as many as McChrystal had requested. The president had thrown his weight, however hesitantly, behind the counterinsurgency crowd.
Today, as McChrystal gears up for an offensive in southern Afghanistan, the prospects for any kind of success look bleak. In June, the death toll for U.S. troops passed 1,000, and the number of IEDs has doubled. Spending hundreds of billions of dollars on the fifth-poorest country on earth has failed to win over the civilian population, whose attitude toward U.S. troops ranges from intensely wary to openly hostile. The biggest military operation of the year – a ferocious offensive that began in February to retake the southern town of Marja – continues to drag on, prompting McChrystal himself to refer to it as a “bleeding ulcer.” In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war in American history – and Obama has quietly begun to back away from the deadline he set for withdrawing U.S. troops in July of next year. The president finds himself stuck in something even more insane than a quagmire: a quagmire he knowingly walked into, even though it’s precisely the kind of gigantic, mind-numbing, multigenerational nation-building project he explicitly said he didn’t want.
Even those who support McChrystal and his strategy of counterinsurgency know that whatever the general manages to accomplish in Afghanistan, it’s going to look more like Vietnam than Desert Storm. “It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win,” says Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, who serves as chief of operations for McChrystal. “This is going to end in an argument.”
The night after his speech in Paris, McChrystal and his staff head to Kitty O’Shea’s, an Irish pub catering to tourists, around the corner from the hotel. His wife, Annie, has joined him for a rare visit: Since the Iraq War began in 2003, she has seen her husband less than 30 days a year. Though it is his and Annie’s 33rd wedding anniversary, McChrystal has invited his inner circle along for dinner and drinks at the “least Gucci” place his staff could find. His wife isn’t surprised. “He once took me to a Jack in the Box when I was dressed in formalwear,” she says with a laugh.
The general’s staff is a handpicked collection of killers, spies, geniuses, patriots, political operators and outright maniacs. There’s a former head of British Special Forces, two Navy Seals, an Afghan Special Forces commando, a lawyer, two fighter pilots and at least two dozen combat veterans and counterinsurgency experts. They jokingly refer to themselves as Team America, taking the name from the South Park-esque sendup of military cluelessness, and they pride themselves on their can-do attitude and their disdain for authority. After arriving in Kabul last summer, Team America set about changing the culture of the International Security Assistance Force, as the NATO-led mission is known. (U.S. soldiers had taken to deriding ISAF as short for “I Suck at Fighting” or “In Sandals and Flip-Flops.”) McChrystal banned alcohol on base, kicked out Burger King and other symbols of American excess, expanded the morning briefing to include thousands of officers and refashioned the command center into a Situational Awareness Room, a free-flowing information hub modeled after Mayor Mike Bloomberg’s offices in New York. He also set a manic pace for his staff, becoming legendary for sleeping four hours a night, running seven miles each morning, and eating one meal a day. (In the month I spend around the general, I witness him eating only once.) It’s a kind of superhuman narrative that has built up around him, a staple in almost every media profile, as if the ability to go without sleep and food translates into the possibility of a man single-handedly winning the war.
By midnight at Kitty O’Shea’s, much of Team America is completely shitfaced. Two officers do an Irish jig mixed with steps from a traditional Afghan wedding dance, while McChrystal’s top advisers lock arms and sing a slurred song of their own invention. “Afghanistan!” they bellow. “Afghanistan!” They call it their Afghanistan song.
McChrystal steps away from the circle, observing his team. “All these men,” he tells me. “I’d die for them. And they’d die for me.”
The assembled men may look and sound like a bunch of combat veterans letting off steam, but in fact this tight-knit group represents the most powerful force shaping U.S. policy in Afghanistan. While McChrystal and his men are in indisputable command of all military aspects of the war, there is no equivalent position on the diplomatic or political side. Instead, an assortment of administration players compete over the Afghan portfolio: U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Special Representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke, National Security Advisor Jim Jones and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, not to mention 40 or so other coalition ambassadors and a host of talking heads who try to insert themselves into the mess, from John Kerry to John McCain. This diplomatic incoherence has effectively allowed McChrystal’s team to call the shots and hampered efforts to build a stable and credible government in Afghanistan. “It jeopardizes the mission,” says Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who supports McChrystal. “The military cannot by itself create governance reform.”
Part of the problem is structural: The Defense Department budget exceeds $600 billion a year, while the State Department receives only $50 billion. But part of the problem is personal: In private, Team McChrystal likes to talk shit about many of Obama’s top people on the diplomatic side. One aide calls Jim Jones, a retired four-star general and veteran of the Cold War, a “clown” who remains “stuck in 1985.” Politicians like McCain and Kerry, says another aide, “turn up, have a meeting with Karzai, criticize him at the airport press conference, then get back for the Sunday talk shows. Frankly, it’s not very helpful.” Only Hillary Clinton receives good reviews from McChrystal’s inner circle. “Hillary had Stan’s back during the strategic review,” says an adviser. “She said, ‘If Stan wants it, give him what he needs.’ ”
McChrystal reserves special skepticism for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating the Taliban. “The Boss says he’s like a wounded animal,” says a member of the general’s team. “Holbrooke keeps hearing rumors that he’s going to get fired, so that makes him dangerous. He’s a brilliant guy, but he just comes in, pulls on a lever, whatever he can grasp onto. But this is COIN, and you can’t just have someone yanking on shit.”
At one point on his trip to Paris, McChrystal checks his BlackBerry. “Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke,” he groans. “I don’t even want to open it.” He clicks on the message and reads the salutation out loud, then stuffs the BlackBerry back in his pocket, not bothering to conceal his annoyance.
“Make sure you don’t get any of that on your leg,” an aide jokes, referring to the e-mail.
By far the most crucial – and strained – relationship is between McChrystal and Eikenberry, the U.S. ambassador. According to those close to the two men, Eikenberry – a retired three-star general who served in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2005 – can’t stand that his former subordinate is now calling the shots. He’s also furious that McChrystal, backed by NATO’s allies, refused to put Eikenberry in the pivotal role of viceroy in Afghanistan, which would have made him the diplomatic equivalent of the general. The job instead went to British Ambassador Mark Sedwill – a move that effectively increased McChrystal’s influence over diplomacy by shutting out a powerful rival. “In reality, that position needs to be filled by an American for it to have weight,” says a U.S. official familiar with the negotiations.
The relationship was further strained in January, when a classified cable that Eikenberry wrote was leaked to The New York Times. The cable was as scathing as it was prescient. The ambassador offered a brutal critique of McChrystal’s strategy, dismissed President Hamid Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner,” and cast doubt on whether the counterinsurgency plan would be “sufficient” to deal with Al Qaeda. “We will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves,” Eikenberry warned, “short of allowing the country to descend again into lawlessness and chaos.”
McChrystal and his team were blindsided by the cable. “I like Karl, I’ve known him for years, but they’d never said anything like that to us before,” says McChrystal, who adds that he felt “betrayed” by the leak. “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’ ”
The most striking example of McChrystal’s usurpation of diplomatic policy is his handling of Karzai. It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with the man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan. The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government, and since Karzai is not considered credible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so. Over the past few months, he has accompanied the president on more than 10 trips around the country, standing beside him at political meetings, or shuras, in Kandahar. In February, the day before the doomed offensive in Marja, McChrystal even drove over to the president’s palace to get him to sign off on what would be the largest military operation of the year. Karzai’s staff, however, insisted that the president was sleeping off a cold and could not be disturbed. After several hours of haggling, McChrystal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan’s defense minister, who persuaded Karzai’s people to wake the president from his nap.
This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed – a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable. Even Team McChrystal privately acknowledges that Karzai is a less-than-ideal partner. “He’s been locked up in his palace the past year,” laments one of the general’s top advisers. At times, Karzai himself has actively undermined McChrystal’s desire to put him in charge. During a recent visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Karzai met three U.S. soldiers who had been wounded in Uruzgan province. “General,” he called out to McChrystal, “I didn’t even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!”
Growing up as a military brat, McChrystal exhibited the mixture of brilliance and cockiness that would follow him throughout his career. His father fought in Korea and Vietnam, retiring as a two-star general, and his four brothers all joined the armed services. Moving around to different bases, McChrystal took solace in baseball, a sport in which he made no pretense of hiding his superiority: In Little League, he would call out strikes to the crowd before whipping a fastball down the middle.
McChrystal entered West Point in 1972, when the U.S. military was close to its all-time low in popularity. His class was the last to graduate before the academy started to admit women. The “Prison on the Hudson,” as it was known then, was a potent mix of testosterone, hooliganism and reactionary patriotism. Cadets repeatedly trashed the mess hall in food fights, and birthdays were celebrated with a tradition called “rat fucking,” which often left the birthday boy outside in the snow or mud, covered in shaving cream. “It was pretty out of control,” says Lt. Gen. David Barno, a classmate who went on to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. The class, filled with what Barno calls “huge talent” and “wild-eyed teenagers with a strong sense of idealism,” also produced Gen. Ray Odierno, the current commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.
The son of a general, McChrystal was also a ringleader of the campus dissidents – a dual role that taught him how to thrive in a rigid, top-down environment while thumbing his nose at authority every chance he got. He accumulated more than 100 hours of demerits for drinking, partying and insubordination – a record that his classmates boasted made him a “century man.” One classmate, who asked not to be named, recalls finding McChrystal passed out in the shower after downing a case of beer he had hidden under the sink. The troublemaking almost got him kicked out, and he spent hours subjected to forced marches in the Area, a paved courtyard where unruly cadets were disciplined. “I’d come visit, and I’d end up spending most of my time in the library, while Stan was in the Area,” recalls Annie, who began dating McChrystal in 1973.
McChrystal wound up ranking 298 out of a class of 855, a serious underachievement for a man widely regarded as brilliant. His most compelling work was extracurricular: As managing editor of The Pointer, the West Point literary magazine, McChrystal wrote seven short stories that eerily foreshadow many of the issues he would confront in his career. In one tale, a fictional officer complains about the difficulty of training foreign troops to fight; in another, a 19-year-old soldier kills a boy he mistakes for a terrorist. In “Brinkman’s Note,” a piece of suspense fiction, the unnamed narrator appears to be trying to stop a plot to assassinate the president. It turns out, however, that the narrator himself is the assassin, and he’s able to infiltrate the White House: “The President strode in smiling. From the right coat pocket of the raincoat I carried, I slowly drew forth my 32-caliber pistol. In Brinkman’s failure, I had succeeded.”
After graduation, 2nd Lt. Stanley McChrystal entered an Army that was all but broken in the wake of Vietnam. “We really felt we were a peacetime generation,” he recalls. “There was the Gulf War, but even that didn’t feel like that big of a deal.” So McChrystal spent his career where the action was: He enrolled in Special Forces school and became a regimental commander of the 3rd Ranger Battalion in 1986. It was a dangerous position, even in peacetime – nearly two dozen Rangers were killed in training accidents during the Eighties. It was also an unorthodox career path: Most soldiers who want to climb the ranks to general don’t go into the Rangers. Displaying a penchant for transforming systems he considers outdated, McChrystal set out to revolutionize the training regime for the Rangers. He introduced mixed martial arts, required every soldier to qualify with night-vision goggles on the rifle range and forced troops to build up their endurance with weekly marches involving heavy backpacks.
In the late 1990s, McChrystal shrewdly improved his inside game, spending a year at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and then at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he co-authored a treatise on the merits and drawbacks of humanitarian interventionism. But as he moved up through the ranks, McChrystal relied on the skills he had learned as a troublemaking kid at West Point: knowing precisely how far he could go in a rigid military hierarchy without getting tossed out. Being a highly intelligent badass, he discovered, could take you far – especially in the political chaos that followed September 11th. “He was very focused,” says Annie. “Even as a young officer he seemed to know what he wanted to do. I don’t think his personality has changed in all these years.”
(C) 2010, ROLLING STONE. FIRST PUBLISHED IN ROLLING STONE (R) MAGAZINE. DISTRIBUTED BY TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES.
The rest of the article can be read in the Rolling Stone magazine and this article can be published on newspapers, magazines and/or On lines by contacting TMSI: www.tmsinternational.com
viernes, 25 de junio de 2010
viernes, 11 de junio de 2010
TURQUIA SUPLANTA A EGIPTO COMO DEFENSOR DE PALESTINA
Turkey Suplanta a Egipto como Defensor de Palestina
Por Alastair Crooke
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
Word Count: 1054
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
Alastair Crooke, exoperativo británico de la M16 en el Medio Oriente, es autor de "Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution" ("Resistencia: La Escencia de la Revolución Islamista"). Dirige el Foro de los Conflictos en Beirut.
BEIRUT, Líbano -- "Éste es un lenguaje que no habíamos escuchado desde la época de Gamal Abdul Nasser." Así escribió el influyente editor en jefe del periódico Al-Quds al-Arabi, refiriéndose a la feroz respuesta del primer ministro de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan al asalto israelí contra la flotilla de Gaza -- agregando que estas posiciones y retórica "masculina" había desaparecido de los diccionarios de nuestros líderes árabes (desde la caída del presidente egipcio Nasser)." Lamentó que "los regímenes árabes ahora representan los únicos amigos que le quedan a Israel."
No hay duda de que es el presidente Hosni Mubarak de Egipto, sucesor de Nasser, a quien Abdel Bari Atwan principalmente se refiere; y no hay duda de que el asunto de la flotilla señala un parteaguas para Egipto -- y a un menor grado para Arabia Saudita. Ni siquiera el notoriamente delgado oído del presidente Mubarak a la simpatía de su propio pueblo por la causa palestina en Gaza podría dejar de escuchar el choque de las placas tectónicas del cambio en el Medio Oriente. Hasta Mubarak se ha sentido obligado a responder al ataque israelí. Ordenó la inmediata apertura del cruce egipcio hacia Gaza.
Lo que hemos estado atestiguando es otro paso -- quizá crucial -- en el cambiante equilibrio estratégico del poder en el Medio Oriente. La causa de los palestinos está pasando gradualmente de las manos de Mubarak y del rey Abdullah de Arabia Saudita. Son los líderes de Irán y Turquía, junto con el presidente Assad de Siria, quienes reconocen los vientos del cambio. Mubarak parece crecientemente aislado y se le proyecta como el más asiduo colaborador de Israel. Aquí en la región, son con frecuencia las embajadas egipcias el centro de las demostraciones populares.
Los motivos de Mubarak para su terco apoyo a Israel son bien conocidos en la región: Está convencido de que la puerta para obtener la luz verde de Washington para que su hijo Gamal pueda sucederle yace en Tel Aviv más que en Washington. Mubarak disfruta un mínimo de apoyo en EUA y si Washington va a ignorar sus principios democráticos para apoyar la imposición de Gamal, será porque Israel dice que este "ojo ciego" de los americanos es esencial para su seguridad.
Con este fin, Mubarak ha trabajado por debilitar y ahuecar la posición de los hamas en Gaza y por fortalecer la del presidente palestino Mahmoud Abbas. De hecho, ha buscado esta política a costa de la unidad palestina -- a pesar de su iniciativa de "unidad" regular. El corretaje unilateral de la paz de los egipcios es considerado aquí como parte del problema más que como parte de alguna solución palestina. Paradójicamente, es precisamente esta postura lo que ha abierto la puerta a que Turquía e Irán aprovechen el patrocinio de la causa palestina.
Pero detrás de esta aguda reacción de Turquía al asalto de Israel contra el barco turco hay una más profunda división regional, y ésta emana de la casi universal convicción de que el "proceso de paz" entre Israel y Palestina ha fracasado. Sus pilares estructurales se han desmoronado: el público israelí ya no cree que el principio de "tierra a cambio de paz" -- el principio de Oslo -- le vaya a traer seguridad. Más bien, los israelíes creen a quienes les dicen que cualquier retiro futuro sólo va a acercar más a los hamas. Los otros pilares de Oslo yacen rotos en el piso: la hasta ahora presumible "reversabilidad" del proyecto de asentamiento israelí y la posibilidad hipotética de que una imposición americana de último recurso a su propia solución se comprendan ahora por no haber sido más que quimeras.
Pero Egipto se niega a ceder ante el cambio en las circunstancias. Está casi solo como aliado de Israel. Pero en el cambio del poder regional hacia la capa norte de estados medioorientales -- Siria, Turquía, Irán, Qatar y Líbano -- continúa, y aumenta el paso. Egipto crecientemente tiene sólo memoria de su pasado grandor sobre el cual sostenerse. En términos contemporáneos su influencia ha estado disminuyendo por algún tiempo.
La única carta de Egipto es que es el otro vecino de Gaza -- fuera de Israel. Ha sido el reconocimiento de Egipto al sitio de Gaza -- alentado por el presidente Abbas en la ribera occidental, quien comparte el deseo de Mubarak de ver debilitados a los hamas -- lo que ha dado a Mubarak su posición en las cuestiones palestinas. Pero la marea islámica y regional estará fluyendo cada vez más fuerte en su contra luego de la acción de Israel en contra de la flotilla.
La Liga Árabe ya está hablando de apoyar a Turquía en cualquier acción legal en contra del asalto israelí contra el convoy de auxilio a Gaza. La Liga Árabe ha emitido también un llamado a otras naciones para romper el sitio israelí sobre Gaza.
Es demasiado temprano para decir que estas palabras señalen un punto de cambio en la política de la Liga Árabe. Pero es más bien el cambio en el balance regional estratégico de la región lo que señala en eje desde el cual el verdadero cambio podría ser posible.
Egipto y Arabia Saudita pueden concluir que el precio de ver el bastón del mando sobre tal cuestión tan clave y emotiva pase a manos no árabes como Irán y Turquía es demasiado alto, y demasiado vergonzoso. El escepticismo casi universal dirigido contra "el procedo de paz" entre sus propios pueblos ya ha dejado a estos líderes expuestos internamente.
Durante casi veinte años estos líderes han usado su involucramiento en el "proceso" como justificación para frenar la disensión interna; pero ya es una herramienta que ha perdido su magia. Ya están pagando el precio del cinismo popular.
Este es el dilema de Mubarak: permanecer bajo el sitio con la esperanza de que América le recompense con la sucesión de Gamal; pero al ignorar los vientos del cambio, pondría poner en peligro la mima supervivencia de Gamal. En cualquier caso, el control de Egipto sobre el "expediente" palestino no volverá a ser el mismo.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
Por Alastair Crooke
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
Word Count: 1054
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
Alastair Crooke, exoperativo británico de la M16 en el Medio Oriente, es autor de "Resistance: The Essence of the Islamist Revolution" ("Resistencia: La Escencia de la Revolución Islamista"). Dirige el Foro de los Conflictos en Beirut.
BEIRUT, Líbano -- "Éste es un lenguaje que no habíamos escuchado desde la época de Gamal Abdul Nasser." Así escribió el influyente editor en jefe del periódico Al-Quds al-Arabi, refiriéndose a la feroz respuesta del primer ministro de Turquía Recep Tayyip Erdogan al asalto israelí contra la flotilla de Gaza -- agregando que estas posiciones y retórica "masculina" había desaparecido de los diccionarios de nuestros líderes árabes (desde la caída del presidente egipcio Nasser)." Lamentó que "los regímenes árabes ahora representan los únicos amigos que le quedan a Israel."
No hay duda de que es el presidente Hosni Mubarak de Egipto, sucesor de Nasser, a quien Abdel Bari Atwan principalmente se refiere; y no hay duda de que el asunto de la flotilla señala un parteaguas para Egipto -- y a un menor grado para Arabia Saudita. Ni siquiera el notoriamente delgado oído del presidente Mubarak a la simpatía de su propio pueblo por la causa palestina en Gaza podría dejar de escuchar el choque de las placas tectónicas del cambio en el Medio Oriente. Hasta Mubarak se ha sentido obligado a responder al ataque israelí. Ordenó la inmediata apertura del cruce egipcio hacia Gaza.
Lo que hemos estado atestiguando es otro paso -- quizá crucial -- en el cambiante equilibrio estratégico del poder en el Medio Oriente. La causa de los palestinos está pasando gradualmente de las manos de Mubarak y del rey Abdullah de Arabia Saudita. Son los líderes de Irán y Turquía, junto con el presidente Assad de Siria, quienes reconocen los vientos del cambio. Mubarak parece crecientemente aislado y se le proyecta como el más asiduo colaborador de Israel. Aquí en la región, son con frecuencia las embajadas egipcias el centro de las demostraciones populares.
Los motivos de Mubarak para su terco apoyo a Israel son bien conocidos en la región: Está convencido de que la puerta para obtener la luz verde de Washington para que su hijo Gamal pueda sucederle yace en Tel Aviv más que en Washington. Mubarak disfruta un mínimo de apoyo en EUA y si Washington va a ignorar sus principios democráticos para apoyar la imposición de Gamal, será porque Israel dice que este "ojo ciego" de los americanos es esencial para su seguridad.
Con este fin, Mubarak ha trabajado por debilitar y ahuecar la posición de los hamas en Gaza y por fortalecer la del presidente palestino Mahmoud Abbas. De hecho, ha buscado esta política a costa de la unidad palestina -- a pesar de su iniciativa de "unidad" regular. El corretaje unilateral de la paz de los egipcios es considerado aquí como parte del problema más que como parte de alguna solución palestina. Paradójicamente, es precisamente esta postura lo que ha abierto la puerta a que Turquía e Irán aprovechen el patrocinio de la causa palestina.
Pero detrás de esta aguda reacción de Turquía al asalto de Israel contra el barco turco hay una más profunda división regional, y ésta emana de la casi universal convicción de que el "proceso de paz" entre Israel y Palestina ha fracasado. Sus pilares estructurales se han desmoronado: el público israelí ya no cree que el principio de "tierra a cambio de paz" -- el principio de Oslo -- le vaya a traer seguridad. Más bien, los israelíes creen a quienes les dicen que cualquier retiro futuro sólo va a acercar más a los hamas. Los otros pilares de Oslo yacen rotos en el piso: la hasta ahora presumible "reversabilidad" del proyecto de asentamiento israelí y la posibilidad hipotética de que una imposición americana de último recurso a su propia solución se comprendan ahora por no haber sido más que quimeras.
Pero Egipto se niega a ceder ante el cambio en las circunstancias. Está casi solo como aliado de Israel. Pero en el cambio del poder regional hacia la capa norte de estados medioorientales -- Siria, Turquía, Irán, Qatar y Líbano -- continúa, y aumenta el paso. Egipto crecientemente tiene sólo memoria de su pasado grandor sobre el cual sostenerse. En términos contemporáneos su influencia ha estado disminuyendo por algún tiempo.
La única carta de Egipto es que es el otro vecino de Gaza -- fuera de Israel. Ha sido el reconocimiento de Egipto al sitio de Gaza -- alentado por el presidente Abbas en la ribera occidental, quien comparte el deseo de Mubarak de ver debilitados a los hamas -- lo que ha dado a Mubarak su posición en las cuestiones palestinas. Pero la marea islámica y regional estará fluyendo cada vez más fuerte en su contra luego de la acción de Israel en contra de la flotilla.
La Liga Árabe ya está hablando de apoyar a Turquía en cualquier acción legal en contra del asalto israelí contra el convoy de auxilio a Gaza. La Liga Árabe ha emitido también un llamado a otras naciones para romper el sitio israelí sobre Gaza.
Es demasiado temprano para decir que estas palabras señalen un punto de cambio en la política de la Liga Árabe. Pero es más bien el cambio en el balance regional estratégico de la región lo que señala en eje desde el cual el verdadero cambio podría ser posible.
Egipto y Arabia Saudita pueden concluir que el precio de ver el bastón del mando sobre tal cuestión tan clave y emotiva pase a manos no árabes como Irán y Turquía es demasiado alto, y demasiado vergonzoso. El escepticismo casi universal dirigido contra "el procedo de paz" entre sus propios pueblos ya ha dejado a estos líderes expuestos internamente.
Durante casi veinte años estos líderes han usado su involucramiento en el "proceso" como justificación para frenar la disensión interna; pero ya es una herramienta que ha perdido su magia. Ya están pagando el precio del cinismo popular.
Este es el dilema de Mubarak: permanecer bajo el sitio con la esperanza de que América le recompense con la sucesión de Gamal; pero al ignorar los vientos del cambio, pondría poner en peligro la mima supervivencia de Gamal. En cualquier caso, el control de Egipto sobre el "expediente" palestino no volverá a ser el mismo.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
jueves, 3 de junio de 2010
LA RESPUESTA DE EUA AL INCIDENTE DE LA FLOTILLA TURKA CONFORMARA EL FUTURO DEL MEDIO ORIENTE
La Respuesta de EUA al Incidente de la Flotilla Turka Conformará el Futuro del Medio Oriente
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
Suat Kiniklioglu es el vicepresidente de asuntos externos del partido AK (Justicia y Desarrollo) y miembro del Consejo Ejecutivo Central del Partido AK.
Suat Kiniklioglu
ANKARA, Turquía -- Soy el único político turco que ha visitado Israel desde que desataron la Guerra de Gaza, y el incidente de Davos entre el presidente israelí Shimon Peres y el primer ministro truco Recep Tayyip Erdogan acentuó las diferencias entre nuestros países. Tengo muchos amigos en Israel, y no dudé en visitar Israel cuando un grupo intelectual israelí me extendió una invitación. A pesar de los muchos retos, mantuve mi optimismo de que Turquía e Israel podría resolver sus diferencias a pesar de los desacuerdos sobre la situación humanitaria en Gaza.
Sin embargo, el lunes fue un punto clave para mí y los 72 millones de ciudadano de mi país. El lunes, Turquía se conmocionó al saber que comandos israelíes estaban atacando una flotilla turca cargada de abastos médicos, juguetes y alimentos con destino a Gaza, matando cuando menos a nueve activistas de la paz en el proceso. El ataque en sí fue ilegal ya que ocurrió en aguas internacionales y, según el exembajador británico Craig Murray, equivale a una "guerra ilegal." Los 600 activistas del barco incluían al Premio Nobel Mairead Corrigan-Maguire, abogados, periodistas y empresarios alemanes y un superviviente del Holocausto de 86 años de edad -- difícilmente objetivos que pudieran presentar una amenaza para los bien armados comandos de Israel.
Los reportes de algunos activistas liberados indican claramente que los comandos israelíes que abordaron el más grande barco de la flotilla dispararon a matar y usaron armas eléctricas paralizantes. Estos reportes difieren agudamente de los que vienen de los políticos y del ejército israelí. Por ello es imperativo que se realice una oportuna, imparcial creíble y transparente investigación conforme a estándares internacionales sobre las muertes de cuando menos nueve civiles a manos de comandos israelíes. La ONU, los turcos y la opinión pública internacional demandan saber qué ocurrió, por qué y quién es responsable de la muerte de estos nueve activista de la paz.
La misión de la flotilla tiene dos dimensiones. Primero, ha dañado irrevocablemente las relaciones entre Turquía e Israel al nivel bilateral. Turquía demanda -- al igual que la ONU -- una investigación independiente por el asesinato de nueve activistas y quiere una disculpa y compensación para aquellos asesinados por comandos israelíes. Ankara también quiere que los responsables de este crimen sean castigados. Nada menos que estas medidas será suficiente. Lo que el gobierno israelí actual no parece comprender es que este asesinato premeditado ha hecho que se pase un umbral crítico en las percepciones turcas vis-a-vis Israel sin importar la persuasión política.
Desde el lunes, los turcos consideramos al actual gobierno israelí como no amigo. No hay duda de que el rompimiento tiene el potencial de escalar si Israel no responde rápida y responsablemente.
Segundo, Hay una importante dimensión internacional en el fiasco de la flotilla. El asesinato de nueva activistas de la paz por Israel de nuevo demostró el claro desacato de las normas internacionales y la ley por parte del gobierno israelí. Más importantemente, La respuesta de los EUA al desproporcionado uso de violencia por los israelíes contra civiles inocentes constituye una prueba para la credibilidad de los EUA en el Medio Oriente. Como muchas naciones europeas, la ONU y la opinión pública, EUA tiene la responsabilidad moral de condenar la violencia de Israel como lo que es. Turquía monitorea estrechamente la respuesta de EUA. Como elocuentemente observó el ministro turco del exterior Ahmet Davutoglu, esta no es una decisión entre Turquía e Israel. Es una decisión entre el bien y el mal. Entre lo legal y lo ilegal.
En muchos aspectos, el Medio Oriente se aproxima a una importante encrucijada.
EUA determinará con qué clase de Medio Oriente estará tratando en el futuro por su respuesta a las acciones de Israel. Esto no podría ser más urgente dada la tensión alrededor del programa nuclear israelí, la precaria situación en Irak y la continua guerra en Afganistán
Además, el ataque contra la flotilla ha acentuado una vez más que el bloque en Gaza no es ya sostenible. Israel no puede ya justificar su inhumano bloqueo en contra de los palestinos en Gaza. Gaza constituye actualmente una prisión al aire libre. Según Amnistía Internacional, 1.4 millones de palestinos son sometidos al castigo colectivo que pretende sofocar a la Franja de Gaza. Desempleo masivo, extrema pobreza y aumentos en los pecios de los alimentos causados por las crisis han dejado a cuatro de cada cinco habitantes en Gaza dependiente de la ayuda humanitaria. Por ello es que la Flotilla de la Libertad quería entregar los auxilios que transportaba. También quería señalar la necesidad de permitir que los habitantes de Gaza comercien e interactúen con el resto del mundo.
Los turcos dimos la bienvenida a los judíos que escapaban de la inquisición en España en 1492. Nuestros diplomáticos han arriesgado sus vidas para salvar a los judíos europeos de los nazis. El Imperio Otomano y Turquía han tradicionalmente sido hospitalarios para los judíos por siglos. Habiendo dicho eso, no podemos ya tolerar las brutales políticas del actual gobierno de Israel, especialmente al costo de las vidas de nuestros ciudadanos. Ni la conciencia de Turquía ni la de la comunidad internacional pueden continuar soportando el peso de las irresponsables políticas del gobierno de Netanyahu.
Como concluye el editorial del Washington Post, el Sr. Netanyahu necesita también ampliar su gobierno para incluir a los partidos pacifistas; uno de los principales problemas son los halcones de su gabinete que han hecho que el término diplomacia israelí sea una incongruencia.
Tanto Israel como Turquía merecen algo mejor.
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
Suat Kiniklioglu es el vicepresidente de asuntos externos del partido AK (Justicia y Desarrollo) y miembro del Consejo Ejecutivo Central del Partido AK.
Suat Kiniklioglu
ANKARA, Turquía -- Soy el único político turco que ha visitado Israel desde que desataron la Guerra de Gaza, y el incidente de Davos entre el presidente israelí Shimon Peres y el primer ministro truco Recep Tayyip Erdogan acentuó las diferencias entre nuestros países. Tengo muchos amigos en Israel, y no dudé en visitar Israel cuando un grupo intelectual israelí me extendió una invitación. A pesar de los muchos retos, mantuve mi optimismo de que Turquía e Israel podría resolver sus diferencias a pesar de los desacuerdos sobre la situación humanitaria en Gaza.
Sin embargo, el lunes fue un punto clave para mí y los 72 millones de ciudadano de mi país. El lunes, Turquía se conmocionó al saber que comandos israelíes estaban atacando una flotilla turca cargada de abastos médicos, juguetes y alimentos con destino a Gaza, matando cuando menos a nueve activistas de la paz en el proceso. El ataque en sí fue ilegal ya que ocurrió en aguas internacionales y, según el exembajador británico Craig Murray, equivale a una "guerra ilegal." Los 600 activistas del barco incluían al Premio Nobel Mairead Corrigan-Maguire, abogados, periodistas y empresarios alemanes y un superviviente del Holocausto de 86 años de edad -- difícilmente objetivos que pudieran presentar una amenaza para los bien armados comandos de Israel.
Los reportes de algunos activistas liberados indican claramente que los comandos israelíes que abordaron el más grande barco de la flotilla dispararon a matar y usaron armas eléctricas paralizantes. Estos reportes difieren agudamente de los que vienen de los políticos y del ejército israelí. Por ello es imperativo que se realice una oportuna, imparcial creíble y transparente investigación conforme a estándares internacionales sobre las muertes de cuando menos nueve civiles a manos de comandos israelíes. La ONU, los turcos y la opinión pública internacional demandan saber qué ocurrió, por qué y quién es responsable de la muerte de estos nueve activista de la paz.
La misión de la flotilla tiene dos dimensiones. Primero, ha dañado irrevocablemente las relaciones entre Turquía e Israel al nivel bilateral. Turquía demanda -- al igual que la ONU -- una investigación independiente por el asesinato de nueve activistas y quiere una disculpa y compensación para aquellos asesinados por comandos israelíes. Ankara también quiere que los responsables de este crimen sean castigados. Nada menos que estas medidas será suficiente. Lo que el gobierno israelí actual no parece comprender es que este asesinato premeditado ha hecho que se pase un umbral crítico en las percepciones turcas vis-a-vis Israel sin importar la persuasión política.
Desde el lunes, los turcos consideramos al actual gobierno israelí como no amigo. No hay duda de que el rompimiento tiene el potencial de escalar si Israel no responde rápida y responsablemente.
Segundo, Hay una importante dimensión internacional en el fiasco de la flotilla. El asesinato de nueva activistas de la paz por Israel de nuevo demostró el claro desacato de las normas internacionales y la ley por parte del gobierno israelí. Más importantemente, La respuesta de los EUA al desproporcionado uso de violencia por los israelíes contra civiles inocentes constituye una prueba para la credibilidad de los EUA en el Medio Oriente. Como muchas naciones europeas, la ONU y la opinión pública, EUA tiene la responsabilidad moral de condenar la violencia de Israel como lo que es. Turquía monitorea estrechamente la respuesta de EUA. Como elocuentemente observó el ministro turco del exterior Ahmet Davutoglu, esta no es una decisión entre Turquía e Israel. Es una decisión entre el bien y el mal. Entre lo legal y lo ilegal.
En muchos aspectos, el Medio Oriente se aproxima a una importante encrucijada.
EUA determinará con qué clase de Medio Oriente estará tratando en el futuro por su respuesta a las acciones de Israel. Esto no podría ser más urgente dada la tensión alrededor del programa nuclear israelí, la precaria situación en Irak y la continua guerra en Afganistán
Además, el ataque contra la flotilla ha acentuado una vez más que el bloque en Gaza no es ya sostenible. Israel no puede ya justificar su inhumano bloqueo en contra de los palestinos en Gaza. Gaza constituye actualmente una prisión al aire libre. Según Amnistía Internacional, 1.4 millones de palestinos son sometidos al castigo colectivo que pretende sofocar a la Franja de Gaza. Desempleo masivo, extrema pobreza y aumentos en los pecios de los alimentos causados por las crisis han dejado a cuatro de cada cinco habitantes en Gaza dependiente de la ayuda humanitaria. Por ello es que la Flotilla de la Libertad quería entregar los auxilios que transportaba. También quería señalar la necesidad de permitir que los habitantes de Gaza comercien e interactúen con el resto del mundo.
Los turcos dimos la bienvenida a los judíos que escapaban de la inquisición en España en 1492. Nuestros diplomáticos han arriesgado sus vidas para salvar a los judíos europeos de los nazis. El Imperio Otomano y Turquía han tradicionalmente sido hospitalarios para los judíos por siglos. Habiendo dicho eso, no podemos ya tolerar las brutales políticas del actual gobierno de Israel, especialmente al costo de las vidas de nuestros ciudadanos. Ni la conciencia de Turquía ni la de la comunidad internacional pueden continuar soportando el peso de las irresponsables políticas del gobierno de Netanyahu.
Como concluye el editorial del Washington Post, el Sr. Netanyahu necesita también ampliar su gobierno para incluir a los partidos pacifistas; uno de los principales problemas son los halcones de su gabinete que han hecho que el término diplomacia israelí sea una incongruencia.
Tanto Israel como Turquía merecen algo mejor.
http://bit.ly/dyFyia
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
martes, 1 de junio de 2010
GOOD FITNESS GOALS ARE MORE THAN MIND OVER MATTER
Good Fitness Goals Are More Than Mind Over Matter
By Eric Heiden, M.D., Tribune Media Services
Eric Heiden
http://bit.ly/b1dY5p
This time of year, everyone is talking about their fitness goals for the summer. It's a pleasant reprieve from all the news about rising obesity levels and our nation's lack of attention to fitness, no doubt.
I get worried, however, when I hear about the money, sweat and enthusiasm people are investing in outsized fitness goals -- say, a marathon veteran working to trim two hours off her marathon time, or someone trying to go from couch-condition to super athlete in a few weeks. Many people are led to believe that they can succeed at anything they put their mind to, if only they want it badly enough.
It's very easy to fall prey to such utterly unfounded proclamations. Throughout much of my life I have been considered a very goal-oriented person. Much of the success I have had has been the result of some dreaming, lots of planning, plenty of hard work and sweat, and a great deal of focus, dedication and concentration. But it's important to distinguish between the scientifically measurable motivation of realistic goals and "mind over matter" thinking.
Goals are key. They can play a significant role in your getting out the door every day to exercise. You need to harness that motivation in your quest for fitness. Your brain holds a great deal of power over exaggerating or minimizing the way you experience training. You often see this in top athletes: At the end of a grueling event, when everyone is exhausted, something happens that motivates them, and they are suddenly fresh and able to take off with renewed power. This shows how dramatically your brain can modulate the way you feel fatigue and other sensations. But it's crucial that your goals work in tandem with reality and that they do not inadvertently thwart your efforts by handing you disappointments instead. Here are some guidelines.
-- If your purpose is to excel at a certain sport, and you have been at it for some time with little improvement, you may have already topped out. If so, concentrate on sharpening components of your performance -- your muscular endurance, skills, flexibility, nutrition and mental focus; carefully plot your training and tapering; or work on achieving a personal best.
-- If you're new to exercise this summer, you may discover steady improvement, but if your improvement isn't as fast or dramatic as you hope, don't give up. People often stop exercising even when they do improve or lose weight because they were hoping they would get even faster or lose even more weight. In other words, they cease their quest for fitness not because they aren't achieving it, but because they aren't achieving some unrealistic ideal of it. So along the way, remember that any improvement is improvement.
-- Likewise, keep a clear head about what to expect regarding physical changes to your body. A person who gets fit does not look like the people in the "after" pictures in the fitness advertisements so ubiquitous this time of year. Many people who have never been exposed to the science of fitness expect real fitness to look like the images used in the marketing of fitness. Models used to market fitness products look that good only with the benefit of special lighting, makeup, airbrushing and other effects.
The real-world reward of fitness is not as dramatic as those 60-second commercials would lead you to expect. Instead, be on the lookout for indications that you have achieved a new level of health, vitality or ability.
(Eric Heiden, M.D., a five-time Olympic gold medalist speed skater, is now an orthopedic surgeon in Utah. He co-authored "Faster, Better, Stronger: Your Fitness Bible" (HarperCollins) with exercise performance physician Max Testa, M.D., and DeAnne Musolf. Visit www.fasterbetterstronger.com.)
http://bit.ly/b1dY5p
(c) 2010 TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
By Eric Heiden, M.D., Tribune Media Services
Eric Heiden
http://bit.ly/b1dY5p
This time of year, everyone is talking about their fitness goals for the summer. It's a pleasant reprieve from all the news about rising obesity levels and our nation's lack of attention to fitness, no doubt.
I get worried, however, when I hear about the money, sweat and enthusiasm people are investing in outsized fitness goals -- say, a marathon veteran working to trim two hours off her marathon time, or someone trying to go from couch-condition to super athlete in a few weeks. Many people are led to believe that they can succeed at anything they put their mind to, if only they want it badly enough.
It's very easy to fall prey to such utterly unfounded proclamations. Throughout much of my life I have been considered a very goal-oriented person. Much of the success I have had has been the result of some dreaming, lots of planning, plenty of hard work and sweat, and a great deal of focus, dedication and concentration. But it's important to distinguish between the scientifically measurable motivation of realistic goals and "mind over matter" thinking.
Goals are key. They can play a significant role in your getting out the door every day to exercise. You need to harness that motivation in your quest for fitness. Your brain holds a great deal of power over exaggerating or minimizing the way you experience training. You often see this in top athletes: At the end of a grueling event, when everyone is exhausted, something happens that motivates them, and they are suddenly fresh and able to take off with renewed power. This shows how dramatically your brain can modulate the way you feel fatigue and other sensations. But it's crucial that your goals work in tandem with reality and that they do not inadvertently thwart your efforts by handing you disappointments instead. Here are some guidelines.
-- If your purpose is to excel at a certain sport, and you have been at it for some time with little improvement, you may have already topped out. If so, concentrate on sharpening components of your performance -- your muscular endurance, skills, flexibility, nutrition and mental focus; carefully plot your training and tapering; or work on achieving a personal best.
-- If you're new to exercise this summer, you may discover steady improvement, but if your improvement isn't as fast or dramatic as you hope, don't give up. People often stop exercising even when they do improve or lose weight because they were hoping they would get even faster or lose even more weight. In other words, they cease their quest for fitness not because they aren't achieving it, but because they aren't achieving some unrealistic ideal of it. So along the way, remember that any improvement is improvement.
-- Likewise, keep a clear head about what to expect regarding physical changes to your body. A person who gets fit does not look like the people in the "after" pictures in the fitness advertisements so ubiquitous this time of year. Many people who have never been exposed to the science of fitness expect real fitness to look like the images used in the marketing of fitness. Models used to market fitness products look that good only with the benefit of special lighting, makeup, airbrushing and other effects.
The real-world reward of fitness is not as dramatic as those 60-second commercials would lead you to expect. Instead, be on the lookout for indications that you have achieved a new level of health, vitality or ability.
(Eric Heiden, M.D., a five-time Olympic gold medalist speed skater, is now an orthopedic surgeon in Utah. He co-authored "Faster, Better, Stronger: Your Fitness Bible" (HarperCollins) with exercise performance physician Max Testa, M.D., and DeAnne Musolf. Visit www.fasterbetterstronger.com.)
http://bit.ly/b1dY5p
(c) 2010 TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
EU FUNDING PROPOSAL IS ONLY THE BEGINNING
EU Funding Proposal Is Only the Beginning
By Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat, Tribune Media Services
Bremmer, Ian
The dramatic EU funding proposal is an important first step. Next comes enforcement of tough fiscal reform guidelines, which introduces a series of new political challenges and risks.
EXCITEMENT AND APPREHENSION
The high-stakes deal among the key member states to provide a huge lending facility for "fiscally challenged" countries was a historic breakthrough. Exhausted EU policy makers expressed a mixture of and excitement and apprehension. Their jobs just got more important, and harder.
On the excitement front -- it buys the eurozone time in the eyes of market participants, and also demonstrates that in a moment of true crisis, the big players (i.e. Germany and France) can compromise and take bold, coordinated policy moves. The deal also implies at least a partial "federalization" of the EU budget, so if all goes well, the primacy and relevance of the EU will be enhanced. Finally, there was a sense of relief that the "fiscal laggards" will finally be held to account in a more credible and systematic manner.
On the apprehension front -- the hard work now begins. It's one thing to announce a huge headline number, but quite another to devise, negotiate and implement that more "credible and systematic" fiscal policy regime.
The tensions and competing fiscal reform agendas were papered over but not truly resolved. The bureaucratic coordination and country-level political challenges will be persistent and real.
EU policy makers think there are a number of possible outcomes: (1) an exit from the euro by one of the "big two" troubled countries (Spain and Italy); (2) a German exit from the euro in the intermediate term (4-5 years); (3) the crisis has effectively been resolved by the funding announcement and initial implementation moves, and the eurozone returns to sustainable growth and stability; (4) a muddle-through story where the euro remains credible and generally resilient, but this is accompanied by ad-hoc responses to mini crises, generally constrained growth and a real risk of political tensions over time among a number of core EU member states.
Scenario four is by far the most likely scenario. The crisis has generated a fiscal consolidation consensus in Europe. And there will be mechanisms to enforce fiscal reforms. In broad terms this consensus will hold in for the rest of 2010.
But there will also be serious tensions, particularly in the intermediate term. At the strategic level, Germany and France still have fundamentally different views about how to manage the trade-offs between inflation and growth (with Germany being more hawkish with regard to inflation), and this will continue to inform their approaches to fiscal reform. At the national level, countries such as Spain will be making dramatic cuts to spending and entitlements. This may prove to be politically unsustainable over time. And at a third, cross-regional level, Eastern European EU member states such as Poland will be inclined to agree with Germany's push for deep fiscal reform in Southern Europe.
What this sets us up for is a complex process of negotiation among competing bureaucracies and countries. If the eurozone is to survive as we know it, this entire new enterprise needs to work well enough. But there will be interconnected political risks emerging in Brussels, among coalitions of EU member states and within individual countries, regarding the costs and benefits of reform.
(Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and the author of "The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?" Preston Keat is director of research for Eurasia Group. They can be reached via e-mail at research@eurasiagroup.net.)
http://bit.ly/bb5SSJ
(C) 2010 TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
By Ian Bremmer and Preston Keat, Tribune Media Services
Bremmer, Ian
The dramatic EU funding proposal is an important first step. Next comes enforcement of tough fiscal reform guidelines, which introduces a series of new political challenges and risks.
EXCITEMENT AND APPREHENSION
The high-stakes deal among the key member states to provide a huge lending facility for "fiscally challenged" countries was a historic breakthrough. Exhausted EU policy makers expressed a mixture of and excitement and apprehension. Their jobs just got more important, and harder.
On the excitement front -- it buys the eurozone time in the eyes of market participants, and also demonstrates that in a moment of true crisis, the big players (i.e. Germany and France) can compromise and take bold, coordinated policy moves. The deal also implies at least a partial "federalization" of the EU budget, so if all goes well, the primacy and relevance of the EU will be enhanced. Finally, there was a sense of relief that the "fiscal laggards" will finally be held to account in a more credible and systematic manner.
On the apprehension front -- the hard work now begins. It's one thing to announce a huge headline number, but quite another to devise, negotiate and implement that more "credible and systematic" fiscal policy regime.
The tensions and competing fiscal reform agendas were papered over but not truly resolved. The bureaucratic coordination and country-level political challenges will be persistent and real.
EU policy makers think there are a number of possible outcomes: (1) an exit from the euro by one of the "big two" troubled countries (Spain and Italy); (2) a German exit from the euro in the intermediate term (4-5 years); (3) the crisis has effectively been resolved by the funding announcement and initial implementation moves, and the eurozone returns to sustainable growth and stability; (4) a muddle-through story where the euro remains credible and generally resilient, but this is accompanied by ad-hoc responses to mini crises, generally constrained growth and a real risk of political tensions over time among a number of core EU member states.
Scenario four is by far the most likely scenario. The crisis has generated a fiscal consolidation consensus in Europe. And there will be mechanisms to enforce fiscal reforms. In broad terms this consensus will hold in for the rest of 2010.
But there will also be serious tensions, particularly in the intermediate term. At the strategic level, Germany and France still have fundamentally different views about how to manage the trade-offs between inflation and growth (with Germany being more hawkish with regard to inflation), and this will continue to inform their approaches to fiscal reform. At the national level, countries such as Spain will be making dramatic cuts to spending and entitlements. This may prove to be politically unsustainable over time. And at a third, cross-regional level, Eastern European EU member states such as Poland will be inclined to agree with Germany's push for deep fiscal reform in Southern Europe.
What this sets us up for is a complex process of negotiation among competing bureaucracies and countries. If the eurozone is to survive as we know it, this entire new enterprise needs to work well enough. But there will be interconnected political risks emerging in Brussels, among coalitions of EU member states and within individual countries, regarding the costs and benefits of reform.
(Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and the author of "The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?" Preston Keat is director of research for Eurasia Group. They can be reached via e-mail at research@eurasiagroup.net.)
http://bit.ly/bb5SSJ
(C) 2010 TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES, INC.
miércoles, 12 de mayo de 2010
LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESION EN LA INTERNET ES UN DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL
La Libertad de Expresión en la Internet Es un Derecho Fundamental
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
Word Count: 972
Bernard Kouchner es ministro del exterior de Francia y fundador de Medecins Sans Frontieres.
Bernard Kouchner
PARIS -- En 2015, 3,500 millones de personas -- la mitad de la humanidad -- tendrán acceso a la Internet. Nunca ha habido una revolución así en la libertad de comunicación y libertad de expresión. Pero, ¿cómo será usado este medio? ¿Qué nuevas distorsiones y obstáculos desarrollarán los enemigos de la Internet?
La tecnología moderna se presta para lo mejor y lo peor. Los sitios de la red extremistas, difamatorios y racistas diseminan odiosas opiniones en tiempo real. Han convertid a la Internet rn una arma para la guerra y el odio. Los sitios web son atacados y usuarios de la web reclutados mediante salas de chat para destructivos planes. Violentos movimientos están infiltrando las redes sociales para extender propaganda e información falsa. Es muy difícil para las democracias controlarlos. No suscribo a la inocente creencia de que una nueva tecnología, sin embargo, por poderosa y eficiente que sea, habrá por su naturaleza de avanzar la libertad en todos los frentes.
Pero, al mismo tiempo, las distorsiones son la excepción más que la regla. La Internet es por encima de todo el más fantástico medio para romper los muros y límites que nos separan de los demás. Para los pueblos oprimidos a quienes se ha robado su derecho a la autoexpresión y el derecho a escoger su propio futuro, la Internet provee un poder que va más allá de sus más alocadas esperanzas. En minutos, nuevas imágenes grabadas por un teléfono pueden diseminarse por todo el mundo en el ciberespacio. Es crecientemente difícil ocultar una demostración pública, un acto de represión o violación a los derechos humanos.
En los países autoritarios y represivos, los teléfonos móviles y la Internet han dado cabida a la opinión pública y a la sociedad civil. También han dado a los ciudadanos un medio crítico de expresión, a pesar de todas sus restricciones.
Sin embargo, la tentación de reprimir la libertad de expresión siempre está presente. El número de países que censuran la Internet, que monitorean a los usuarios de la web y los castigan por sus opiniones, está creciendo a una tasa alarmante. La Internet puede usarse en contra de los ciudadanos. Puede ser una formidable herramienta para captar información y detectar a los potenciales disidentes. Algunos regímenes ya están adquiriendo sofisticada tecnología para la vigilancia.
Si todos los que tienen apego a los derechos humanos y a la democracia se negaran a comprometer sus principios y utilizaran la Internet para defender la libertad de expresión, esta clase de represión sería mucho más difícil. No hablo de la libertad absoluta que abre la puerta a toda clase de abusos. Nadie está promoviendo eso. En lugar de ello, hablo de la verdadera libertad, que se basa en los principios del respeto por la dignidad humana y los derechos humanos.
En los últimos pocos años, instituciones multilaterales como el Consejo para Europa, y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, como Reporteros Sin fronteras, junto a miles de individuos alrededor del mundo, han hecho un fuerte compromiso con estos temas. Esto es prueba, si se necesitara prueba, de que el tema no enfrenta a occidente contra el resto del mundo. No menos de 180 países reunidos para la Cumbre Mundial de la Sociedad de la Información reconocieron que la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos se aplica plenamente a la Internet, especialmente el artículo 19, que establece libertad de expresión y libertad de opinión. Aún así, alrededor de 50 países no cumplen con sus compromisos.
En ocasión del Día Mundial de la Libertad de Prensa la semana pasada, reuní a expertos, líderes de ONGs, periodistas, empresarios e intelectuales. Sus discusiones han confirmado mi convicción de que el camino que deseamos tomar es el correcto. Creo que debemos crear un instrumento internacional para monitorear los compromisos que han hecho los gobiernos y pedir que cumplan cuando fallen. Creo que debemos proveer asistencia a los ciberdisidentes, quienes han de recibir el mismo apoyo que otras víctimas de la represión política, y mostrar nuestra solidaridad con ellos públicamente, en estrecha colaboración con las ONGs que trabajan en estos temas. Creo que también debemos discutir la conveniencia de adoptar un código de conducta respecto a la exportación de tecnologías para censurar la Internet y seguir la huella de los usuarios de la red.
Estas cuestiones, junto con otras, como la protección de la información personal en la Internet y el derecho a la amnistía digital para todos, promovida por mi colega Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, debe promoverse dentro de un marco que una al gobierno, la sociedad civil y los expertos internacionales.
Otro proyecto está cerca de mi corazón. Será una larga y difícil tarea implementarlo, pero es crítico. Es dar a la Internet status legal que refleje su universalidad. Algo que la reconozca como espacio internacional, de manera que sea más difícil que los gobiernos represivos utilicen su soberanía como argumento contra las libertades fundamentales.
Esta es una cuestión crítica. Creo que la batalla de ideas ha comenzado con, de un lado, los defensores de una Internet abierta e universal, basada en la libertad de expresión y la libertad de asociación, en la tolerancia y respeto por la privacidad y del otro lado, quienes quieren transformar a la Internet en una multitud de espacios cerrados entre sí para servir a los propósitos de un régimen, propaganda y todas formas de fanatismo.
La libertad de expresión es "la base de todas las demás libertades." Sin ella, no hay "naciones libres," dijo Voltaire. El espíritu de la ilustración, que es universal, debe correr por todos los nuevos medios. La defensa de las libertades fundamentales y los derechos humanos debe ser la prioridad del gobierno del a Internet. Es asunto de todos.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES.
Paging and Bottom Toolbar
Global Viewpoint - Spanish
Word Count: 972
Bernard Kouchner es ministro del exterior de Francia y fundador de Medecins Sans Frontieres.
Bernard Kouchner
PARIS -- En 2015, 3,500 millones de personas -- la mitad de la humanidad -- tendrán acceso a la Internet. Nunca ha habido una revolución así en la libertad de comunicación y libertad de expresión. Pero, ¿cómo será usado este medio? ¿Qué nuevas distorsiones y obstáculos desarrollarán los enemigos de la Internet?
La tecnología moderna se presta para lo mejor y lo peor. Los sitios de la red extremistas, difamatorios y racistas diseminan odiosas opiniones en tiempo real. Han convertid a la Internet rn una arma para la guerra y el odio. Los sitios web son atacados y usuarios de la web reclutados mediante salas de chat para destructivos planes. Violentos movimientos están infiltrando las redes sociales para extender propaganda e información falsa. Es muy difícil para las democracias controlarlos. No suscribo a la inocente creencia de que una nueva tecnología, sin embargo, por poderosa y eficiente que sea, habrá por su naturaleza de avanzar la libertad en todos los frentes.
Pero, al mismo tiempo, las distorsiones son la excepción más que la regla. La Internet es por encima de todo el más fantástico medio para romper los muros y límites que nos separan de los demás. Para los pueblos oprimidos a quienes se ha robado su derecho a la autoexpresión y el derecho a escoger su propio futuro, la Internet provee un poder que va más allá de sus más alocadas esperanzas. En minutos, nuevas imágenes grabadas por un teléfono pueden diseminarse por todo el mundo en el ciberespacio. Es crecientemente difícil ocultar una demostración pública, un acto de represión o violación a los derechos humanos.
En los países autoritarios y represivos, los teléfonos móviles y la Internet han dado cabida a la opinión pública y a la sociedad civil. También han dado a los ciudadanos un medio crítico de expresión, a pesar de todas sus restricciones.
Sin embargo, la tentación de reprimir la libertad de expresión siempre está presente. El número de países que censuran la Internet, que monitorean a los usuarios de la web y los castigan por sus opiniones, está creciendo a una tasa alarmante. La Internet puede usarse en contra de los ciudadanos. Puede ser una formidable herramienta para captar información y detectar a los potenciales disidentes. Algunos regímenes ya están adquiriendo sofisticada tecnología para la vigilancia.
Si todos los que tienen apego a los derechos humanos y a la democracia se negaran a comprometer sus principios y utilizaran la Internet para defender la libertad de expresión, esta clase de represión sería mucho más difícil. No hablo de la libertad absoluta que abre la puerta a toda clase de abusos. Nadie está promoviendo eso. En lugar de ello, hablo de la verdadera libertad, que se basa en los principios del respeto por la dignidad humana y los derechos humanos.
En los últimos pocos años, instituciones multilaterales como el Consejo para Europa, y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, como Reporteros Sin fronteras, junto a miles de individuos alrededor del mundo, han hecho un fuerte compromiso con estos temas. Esto es prueba, si se necesitara prueba, de que el tema no enfrenta a occidente contra el resto del mundo. No menos de 180 países reunidos para la Cumbre Mundial de la Sociedad de la Información reconocieron que la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos se aplica plenamente a la Internet, especialmente el artículo 19, que establece libertad de expresión y libertad de opinión. Aún así, alrededor de 50 países no cumplen con sus compromisos.
En ocasión del Día Mundial de la Libertad de Prensa la semana pasada, reuní a expertos, líderes de ONGs, periodistas, empresarios e intelectuales. Sus discusiones han confirmado mi convicción de que el camino que deseamos tomar es el correcto. Creo que debemos crear un instrumento internacional para monitorear los compromisos que han hecho los gobiernos y pedir que cumplan cuando fallen. Creo que debemos proveer asistencia a los ciberdisidentes, quienes han de recibir el mismo apoyo que otras víctimas de la represión política, y mostrar nuestra solidaridad con ellos públicamente, en estrecha colaboración con las ONGs que trabajan en estos temas. Creo que también debemos discutir la conveniencia de adoptar un código de conducta respecto a la exportación de tecnologías para censurar la Internet y seguir la huella de los usuarios de la red.
Estas cuestiones, junto con otras, como la protección de la información personal en la Internet y el derecho a la amnistía digital para todos, promovida por mi colega Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, debe promoverse dentro de un marco que una al gobierno, la sociedad civil y los expertos internacionales.
Otro proyecto está cerca de mi corazón. Será una larga y difícil tarea implementarlo, pero es crítico. Es dar a la Internet status legal que refleje su universalidad. Algo que la reconozca como espacio internacional, de manera que sea más difícil que los gobiernos represivos utilicen su soberanía como argumento contra las libertades fundamentales.
Esta es una cuestión crítica. Creo que la batalla de ideas ha comenzado con, de un lado, los defensores de una Internet abierta e universal, basada en la libertad de expresión y la libertad de asociación, en la tolerancia y respeto por la privacidad y del otro lado, quienes quieren transformar a la Internet en una multitud de espacios cerrados entre sí para servir a los propósitos de un régimen, propaganda y todas formas de fanatismo.
La libertad de expresión es "la base de todas las demás libertades." Sin ella, no hay "naciones libres," dijo Voltaire. El espíritu de la ilustración, que es universal, debe correr por todos los nuevos medios. La defensa de las libertades fundamentales y los derechos humanos debe ser la prioridad del gobierno del a Internet. Es asunto de todos.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES.
Paging and Bottom Toolbar
martes, 11 de mayo de 2010
GREEK CRISIS IS ONLY TIP OF SOVEREIGN DEBT ICEBERG
http://bit.ly/djFwll
Roubini: Greek Crisis is Only Tip of Sovereign Debt Iceberg
By Nouriel Roubini
Global Viewpoint
Word Count: 944
Nouriel Roubini, a professor of economics at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics has come to be popularly known as "Dr. Doom" for having predicted the recent financial crisis. He is author of "Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance." His comments here are adapted from remarks at the Milken Global Conference in Beverly Hills, California, on Wednesday, April 28.
LOS ANGELES -- Financial crises have occurred very often in history. They are caused by unsustainable bubbles that go bust, and from excessive risk-taking and debt-leveraging by the private sector during the bubble. Then in the wake of, and as part of the response to, the economic downturn, government debts and deficits grow to unsustainable levels that can lead to default or inflation if not corrected. The crisis we are going through now follows this pattern.
Today there is a lot of talk about "de-leveraging," yet the data shows that de-leveraging has barely begun. Debt ratios in the corporate sector as well as households in the U.S. have essentially stabilized at high levels.
At the same time, we are seeing a massive "re-leveraging" of the public sector with budget deficits on the order of 10 percent of GDP. The IMF and OECD are projecting that the stock of public debt in advanced economies is going to double and reach an average level of 100 percent of GDP in the coming years.
This is all actually quite typical of what happens in a financial crisis. What explains this re-leveraging? First, "automatic stabilizers" (such as unemployment compensation) came into play during the recession. Second, countercyclical fiscal policies (such as tax cuts and spending increases) have been implemented by government to avoid depression because private demand is collapsing. Third, we have decided to socialize some of the private losses in the financial, corporate and housing sectors and put them on the balance sheet of the government.
So, there is a massive buildup of public debt. And the lesson of history is that unless this buildup of sovereign debt is tackled eventually by raising taxes and controlling spending, then there are only two outcomes: default or high inflation.
Historically, we have seen a series of defaults and sovereign debt crises in both advanced and emerging market economies. If you are a country like the U.S., the U.K. or Japan that can monetize its fiscal deficits, then you won't have a sovereign debt event but high inflation that erodes the value of public debt. Inflation is therefore basically a capital transfer from creditors and savers to borrowers and dissavers, essentially from the private sector to the government.
While the markets these days are worrying about Greece, it is only the tip of the iceberg, or the canary in the coal mine of a much broader range of fiscal crises. Today it is Greece. Tomorrow it will be Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland. Sooner or later Japan and the U.S. will be at the core of the problem, shaking the global economy.
We need to recognize that we are in the next stage of financial crisis. The coming issue is not private-sector liabilities, but pubic-sector liabilities.
Revived economic growth alone will not generate enough tax revenue to relieve this sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal deficits are huge and structural. They are not due solely to a cyclical downturn in growth but to long-term commitments such as pensions, social security and health care. To avoid default or high inflation, the advanced economies will require some combination of raising revenues through taxes and cutting government spending.
In Europe, where tax rates are already very high, the right adjustment is cutting spending instead of raising taxes further. In the U.S., the average tax burden as a share of GDP is much lower than in other advanced economies. The right adjustment for the U.S. would be to phase in revenue increases gradually over time so that you don't kill the recovery while controlling the growth of government spending.
What worries me most is the political gridlock in Washington. While everyone agrees that $10 trillion deficits (by the Obama administration's own estimates) for the next decade are not sustainable, there is no political will to act. The two parties are completely divided. Effectively, the Republicans are against any form of revenue increases. The Democrats are against spending cuts, especially of entitlements.
If the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives in the next election and refuse any revenue increases while the Democrats veto spending cuts, the path of least resistance will be runaway fiscal deficits which will then be monetized by the Federal Reserve, which has already embarked on this path. In just the last year alone, the Federal Reserve has bought $1.8 trillion of Treasury securities and agency debt, a course that will inevitably lead to high inflation if sustained. It is what is popularly known as printing money.
In Greece (with yields higher than 12 percent on two-year bonds -- ed.) or Spain or Portugal, the bond markets are forcing an adjustment. In spite of the recession, the markets are telling them to either straighten out their problems or go bankrupt.
Unfortunately, there is no such adjustment being forced upon Washington at the moment because the bond market has not woken up to the dangers ahead. You can borrow at a zero percent rate on the short end and 3.6 percent on the long end. As a result, the political system is going to resist fiscal consolidation. This means the risk of something serious happening in the U.S. in the next two or three years is significant.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
Roubini: Greek Crisis is Only Tip of Sovereign Debt Iceberg
By Nouriel Roubini
Global Viewpoint
Word Count: 944
Nouriel Roubini, a professor of economics at New York University and chairman of Roubini Global Economics has come to be popularly known as "Dr. Doom" for having predicted the recent financial crisis. He is author of "Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance." His comments here are adapted from remarks at the Milken Global Conference in Beverly Hills, California, on Wednesday, April 28.
LOS ANGELES -- Financial crises have occurred very often in history. They are caused by unsustainable bubbles that go bust, and from excessive risk-taking and debt-leveraging by the private sector during the bubble. Then in the wake of, and as part of the response to, the economic downturn, government debts and deficits grow to unsustainable levels that can lead to default or inflation if not corrected. The crisis we are going through now follows this pattern.
Today there is a lot of talk about "de-leveraging," yet the data shows that de-leveraging has barely begun. Debt ratios in the corporate sector as well as households in the U.S. have essentially stabilized at high levels.
At the same time, we are seeing a massive "re-leveraging" of the public sector with budget deficits on the order of 10 percent of GDP. The IMF and OECD are projecting that the stock of public debt in advanced economies is going to double and reach an average level of 100 percent of GDP in the coming years.
This is all actually quite typical of what happens in a financial crisis. What explains this re-leveraging? First, "automatic stabilizers" (such as unemployment compensation) came into play during the recession. Second, countercyclical fiscal policies (such as tax cuts and spending increases) have been implemented by government to avoid depression because private demand is collapsing. Third, we have decided to socialize some of the private losses in the financial, corporate and housing sectors and put them on the balance sheet of the government.
So, there is a massive buildup of public debt. And the lesson of history is that unless this buildup of sovereign debt is tackled eventually by raising taxes and controlling spending, then there are only two outcomes: default or high inflation.
Historically, we have seen a series of defaults and sovereign debt crises in both advanced and emerging market economies. If you are a country like the U.S., the U.K. or Japan that can monetize its fiscal deficits, then you won't have a sovereign debt event but high inflation that erodes the value of public debt. Inflation is therefore basically a capital transfer from creditors and savers to borrowers and dissavers, essentially from the private sector to the government.
While the markets these days are worrying about Greece, it is only the tip of the iceberg, or the canary in the coal mine of a much broader range of fiscal crises. Today it is Greece. Tomorrow it will be Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland. Sooner or later Japan and the U.S. will be at the core of the problem, shaking the global economy.
We need to recognize that we are in the next stage of financial crisis. The coming issue is not private-sector liabilities, but pubic-sector liabilities.
Revived economic growth alone will not generate enough tax revenue to relieve this sovereign debt crisis. Fiscal deficits are huge and structural. They are not due solely to a cyclical downturn in growth but to long-term commitments such as pensions, social security and health care. To avoid default or high inflation, the advanced economies will require some combination of raising revenues through taxes and cutting government spending.
In Europe, where tax rates are already very high, the right adjustment is cutting spending instead of raising taxes further. In the U.S., the average tax burden as a share of GDP is much lower than in other advanced economies. The right adjustment for the U.S. would be to phase in revenue increases gradually over time so that you don't kill the recovery while controlling the growth of government spending.
What worries me most is the political gridlock in Washington. While everyone agrees that $10 trillion deficits (by the Obama administration's own estimates) for the next decade are not sustainable, there is no political will to act. The two parties are completely divided. Effectively, the Republicans are against any form of revenue increases. The Democrats are against spending cuts, especially of entitlements.
If the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives in the next election and refuse any revenue increases while the Democrats veto spending cuts, the path of least resistance will be runaway fiscal deficits which will then be monetized by the Federal Reserve, which has already embarked on this path. In just the last year alone, the Federal Reserve has bought $1.8 trillion of Treasury securities and agency debt, a course that will inevitably lead to high inflation if sustained. It is what is popularly known as printing money.
In Greece (with yields higher than 12 percent on two-year bonds -- ed.) or Spain or Portugal, the bond markets are forcing an adjustment. In spite of the recession, the markets are telling them to either straighten out their problems or go bankrupt.
Unfortunately, there is no such adjustment being forced upon Washington at the moment because the bond market has not woken up to the dangers ahead. You can borrow at a zero percent rate on the short end and 3.6 percent on the long end. As a result, the political system is going to resist fiscal consolidation. This means the risk of something serious happening in the U.S. in the next two or three years is significant.
(c) GLOBAL VIEWPOINT NETWORK/TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES
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